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Abstract
Hannah Arendt valued the unprecedented, the unexpected, and the new, yet in essays 
crafted at the end of the rebellious 1960s, struggled to square this valuation with 
a palpable desire for law and order. She lamented that criminality had overtaken 
American life, accused the police of not arresting enough criminals, and charged 
‘the Negro community’ with standing behind what she named black violence. At 
once, she praised ‘the white rebels’ of the student movement in the United States for 
their courageous acts of disobedience. This essay explores how differential Arendt’s 
treatment of lawbreaking action was in an effort to understand how ‘certain sec-
tions of the population’ in the United States could appear to stand for criminality 
rather than civil disobedience to her mind. It examines how Arendt’s reflections on 
the ostensibly non-racial subjects of civil disobedience and lawbreaking were under-
written by racial, when not racist, ways of thinking. The essay also raises a larger 
question: to the extent that the concept of civil disobedience involves limits, how 
are those limits drawn to the exclusion of certain kinds of actors and their particular 
claims in the public realm? Pondering this question through Arendt, it concludes 
that in her theorization of civil disobedience, Arendt was profoundly limited by the 
fabulous tale that the United States is an exceptional land of freedom and democracy 
in the world.
Keywords Hannah Arendt · Civil disobedience · Lawbreaking · Race · Racism · 
Violence
 * Ayça Çubukçu 
 a.cubukcu@lse.ac.uk
1 London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
 A. Çubukçu 
1 3
Hannah Arendt was conservative in more ways than one.1 She valued the unprec-
edented, the unexpected, and the new,2 yet in ‘Civil Disobedience’ and other essays 
crafted at the end of the rebellious 1960s, struggled to square this valuation with 
a palpable desire for law and order. She lamented that criminality had overtaken 
American life, accused the police of not arresting enough criminals (Arendt 1970, 
pp. 70–74), and charged ‘the Negro community’ with standing behind what she 
named black violence (Arendt 1969, p. 19). At once, she praised ‘the white rebels’ 
of the student movement in the United States for their courageous acts of disobedi-
ence. In what follows, my aim is to explore how differential Arendt’s treatment of 
lawbreaking action was.3 This will require engagement with the conceptual distinc-
tions she proposed—distinctions between power and violence, civil and criminal, 
politics and morality, opinion and interest—in an effort to understand how ‘certain 
sections of the population’ in the United States could appear to stand, to her mind, 
for criminality rather than civil disobedience.
While the importance of Arendt as ‘one of the seminal thinkers of the twentieth 
century’ is now well established,4 she has even acquired ‘saintly status’5 in some 
scholarly milieux, especially in the United States. Nonetheless, groundbreaking 
scholarship culminating with Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, published in 
2014 by the philosopher Kathryn T. Gines, has provided a ‘systematic analysis of 
anti-Black racism in Arendt’s work’.6 Focusing on a subject only cursorily explored 
3 I reflect on the problem of lawbreaking in the case of Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (1994) in another essay, Çubukçu (2015).
4 See Passerin d’Entrèves (2019). Craig Calhoun and John McGowan offer an informative narrative of 
what was once Arendt’s wavering prominence in the US academy, from the 1950s through 1996. See 
Calhoun and McGowan (1997). In contrast, note how an endorsement for John McGowan’s book, Han-
nah Arendt: An Introduction (1998) already declares in 1998 that the book is a welcome addition to ‘the 
growth industry known as Arendt studies’. For my earlier contributions to this ‘industry’, see Çubukçu 
(2015, 2017).
5 I thank Nathaniel Berman for this formulation.
6 See the publisher’s summary of Gines (2014), Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question on the back 
cover of the book and on its website. For earlier work exploring anti-Black themes in Arendt which later 
scholarship built on, see Dossa (1980, pp. 309–323) and Norton (1995, pp. 247–262).
1 Many scholars concur with Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves (1994, p. 1) that Arendt ‘cannot be character-
ized in terms of the traditional categories of liberalism, conservatism and socialism’. Nevertheless, James 
Martel (2011, pp. 143–157) has studied Arendt as an anarchist thinker. While I agree with Hutchings 
(2017, p. 33) that one of the most remarkable things about Arendt’s work is ‘its capacity to unsettle com-
fort zones of ideological right/left thinking and the impossibility of incorporating it under any particular 
“ism”’, in this essay, I am interested in exploring Arendt’s (1970, p. 89) conservative tendencies (rather 
than Arendt as a conservative) in the context of the United States in the late 1960s, which she character-
ized as a ‘revolutionary situation’. I will return to this point in part III of this essay. Although limitations 
of space disallow a discussion, the wider historical context of the period under consideration is the Cold 
War and ‘the iconic year 1968’, which ‘marks the 1960s as a global moment’ (Marotti 2009, p. 97). For 
a careful reading of Arendt and her conceptualization of ‘totalitarianism’ in the context of the Cold War, 
see Losurdo (2004, pp. 25–255). I thank Sebastian Budgen for this reference.
2 For an examination of the constitutive role of ‘the unprecedented’ in Arendt, see Çubukçu (2015, pp. 
684–704). For an analysis of ‘the politics of the extraordinary’ in Arendt’s thought in relation to the per-
plexities of revolution, constitution making, action, and freedom, see Kalyvas (2008, pp. 70–74).
1 3
Of Rebels and Disobedients: Reflections on Arendt, Race,…
by Gines,7 I aim here to contribute to critical studies of Arendt’s thought by offer-
ing an interpretation of this profound yet problematic thinker’s reflections on civil 
disobedience in the late 1960s. Like Gines, ‘I am not attempting to dismiss Arendt’s 
thought altogether and label her a racist’ (2014, p. 91). That, to my mind, would be 
less fruitful an endeavour than attempting to understand how Arendt’s reflections on 
the ostensibly non-racial subjects of civil disobedience and lawbreaking were under-
written by racial, when not racist—depending on one’s interpretation of this con-
cept8—ways of thinking. If, as recently as 2018, a conference on ‘Citizenship and 
Civil Disobedience’ held at the Hannah Arendt Center in the United States can be 
introduced at length without observing how Arendt categorically excluded certain 
citizens, particularly the Black Power movement, from the zone of civil disobedi-
ence, this may still prove worthwhile an effort (see Berkowitz 2018).
On the other hand, I raise in this essay a larger question: to the extent that the con-
cept of civil disobedience involves limits (imposed, among others, by the require-
ment of ‘civility’ and the presumption that a given state is fundamentally just), how 
are those limits drawn to the exclusion of certain kinds of actors and their particu-
lar claims in the public realm?9 Pondering this question through Arendt, instead of 
concluding that she was ‘one of the most prescient observers of America’ (Berkow-
itz 2018) or the phenomenon of civil disobedience, we may learn from the ways in 
which she was profoundly limited—despite warnings offered by her contemporar-
ies10—by the fabulous tale that the United States is an exceptional land of freedom 
and democracy in the world. In the end, it was political actors, racialized politi-
cal actors, whose lawbreaking action challenged the foundational tales of American 
exceptionalism, whom Arendt barred from the category of civil disobedience.
7 Unfortunately, Gines (2014, pp. 120–122) considers Arendt’s ‘Civil Disobedience’ very briefly.
8 While examining the immense debate about what racism does and does not entail is beyond the scope 
of this essay, considering Arendt, I will return to this question in part III. For an effort to develop ‘philo-
sophical methodologies for (re)conceptualizing race and racism’ beyond the black/white binary in the 
context of the United States, see Critical Philosophy of Race (2013). For a revealing survey of ‘(white) 
Western intellectuals’, particularly Arendt’s contemporaries from Germany, which historically situates—
if not excuses—Arendt’s views on ‘race and culture’, see King (2010, pp. 113–134).
9 I thank both Partha Chatterjee and Tobias Kelly for teasing out this question in their comments on an 
earlier version of essay. See Kelly’s (Thiranagama et al. 2018) co-authored piece on ‘civility’ for a criti-
cal, anthropological approach to this concept and its operations. For a contemporary ‘defense of uncivil 
disobedience’, even in ‘supposedly legitimate, liberal democratic states’, see Delmas (2018), particularly 
chapter two.
10 For a review of ‘the opportunities Arendt had to engage with Black intellectuals about the Negro 
question’, see Gines (2014, pp. 3–7). For an account of Arendt’s exchange with James Baldwin, see 
Caver (2019, pp. 35–61). For an exclusive focus on Arendt’s German contemporaries, ‘who spoke of 
racial and crosscultural matters in ways remarkably similar to, or even more ethnocentric than Arendt’, 




When introducing ‘Civil Disobedience’ in 1970, published in her anthology Crises 
of the Republic, Arendt raised three matters in a single breath. First was ‘the disas-
trous increase in crime in the streets’; second, the undermining of ‘any simple faith 
in the central importance of fidelity to law’; and third ‘ample evidence that skilfully 
organized campaigns of civil disobedience can be very effective in securing desir-
able changes in the law’ (Arendt 1970, p. 51).11 All three matters involved lawbreak-
ing, or ‘disobedience to the law’ in her parlance (Arendt 1970, p. 51). Although 
Arendt brought up these matters as possible explanations for the cry of despair she 
heard in the primary question—‘Is the law dead?’—then occupying jurists of New 
York City’s Bar Association (Arendt 1970, p. 51), the central concern of her essay 
was arguably another. How, if at all, could disobedience to the law be justified? In 
particular, at stake in ‘Civil Disobedience’ was the justifiability, if any, of lawbreak-
ing action in ‘a society of consent’ such as is the United States ostensibly (Arendt 
1970, p. 51).
In response to this problem, Arendt appraised, and rejected, various justifications 
developed in the 1960s by jurists sympathetic to civil disobedience in order to solve 
the chief difficulty they faced—namely, that ‘the law cannot justify the breaking 
of the law’ (Arendt 1970, p. 53).12 Some of these jurists had attempted to address 
this difficulty by asserting the compatibility of civil disobedience with the duality 
of American law (Arendt 1970, p. 53). These jurisprudential attempts were refuted 
‘on factual grounds’, Arendt found, when ‘the civil disobedients of the civil-rights 
movement smoothly developed into the resisters of the antiwar movement who 
clearly disobeyed federal law’ (Arendt 1970, p. 53). Now, by appeals to a ‘higher 
law’, the disobedients were challenging not only particular state laws but also federal 
law, and jurists who had conveniently identified this ‘higher law’ with the U.S. con-
stitution were thrown back to ground zero. How then was the line between ‘common 
criminals’ and ‘civil disobedients’ to be drawn when, in a period of crisis, the very 
distinction between the two—a distinction Arendt was thoroughly invested in main-
taining—had become ‘more fragile’ in character (Arendt 1970, p. 55)?
Arendt found that the ‘confusion, polarization and growing bitterness’ of debates 
around these questions were partly caused by a theoretical failure to understand ‘the 
true character of the phenomenon’ (Arendt 1970, p. 55).
Whenever the jurists attempt to justify the civil disobedient on moral and legal 
grounds, they construe his case in the image of either the conscientious objec-
tor or the man who tests the constitutionality of a statute. The trouble is that 
the situation of the civil disobedient bears no analogy to either for the simple 
11 Arendt took the last two quotations directly from Hughes (1968), ‘Civil Disobedience and the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine’.
12 Arendt quotes Carl Cohen here and uses this quotation multiple times in ‘Civil Disobedience’. Partly 
because ‘the law cannot justify the breaking of the law’, she explicitly proposes a political approach to 
the problem of civil disobedience.
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reason that he never exists as a single individual; he can function and survive 
only as a member of a group. (Arendt 1970, p. 55)
Thus, Arendt insisted, one of the chief characteristics of civil disobedience was that 
it presupposed group action. She thought the Freedom Riders13 of the American 
civil rights movement was a paradigmatic case of civil disobedience, for these activ-
ists could only enact ‘indirect disobedience’ by collectively violating laws, of traffic 
for instance, that they regarded as ‘nonobjectionable in themselves in order to pro-
test unjust ordinances or governmental policies and executive orders’ (Arendt 1970, 
p. 56). It was ‘precisely this indirect disobedience’, Arendt further found, ‘which 
would make no sense whatsoever in the case of the conscientious objector or the 
man who breaks a specific law to test its constitutionality, that seems legally unjusti-
fiable’ (1970, p. 56).
This seeming legal unjustifiability was to lend credence to the need Arendt 
would immediately assert to distinguish between conscientious objection and civil 
disobedience:
Hence, we must distinguish between conscientious objectors and civil diso-
bedients. The latter are in fact organized minorities, bound together by com-
mon opinion, rather than by common interest, and the decision to take a stand 
against the government’s policies even if they have reason to assume that 
these policies are backed by a majority; their concerted action springs from 
an agreement with each other, and it is this agreement that lends credence and 
conviction to their opinion, no matter how they may have originally arrived at 
it. (Arendt, 1970, pp. 56–57)
The constitutive contrast between ‘common opinion’ and ‘common interest’ in this 
passage is not incidental as it reflects a web of conceptual distinctions that Arendt 
developed in other writings around 1968, including ‘Truth and Politics’ and On Vio-
lence.14 In Arendt’s judgement, while opinions could be ‘impartial’ and generaliza-
ble through persuasion and agreement among those acting in concert, interests were 
‘subjective’ and particular, even if they too could be shared among members of a 
group. Opinions, for Arendt, were (to be) formed in disinterested a fashion, where 
disinterestedness was to be understood and practiced as ‘the liberation from one’s 
own private interests’ (Arendt 1993a, p. 242). ‘Interests’ were unpolitical to the 
extent that, like conscience, they concerned ‘man in his singularity’ (Arendt 1993a, 
p. 246) and not man as a citizen, ‘an acting being concerned with the world and the 
public welfare rather than his own well-being’ (Arendt 1993a, p. 245). Man qua citi-
zen, aiming for the ‘common good’, would (have to) form his opinion impartially, 
free ‘from the private interests that make it blind, from the subjective illusions that 
entrap it’.15
14 For a review of Arendt’s understanding of ‘opinion’ in relation to ‘politics’, see Enaudeau and Bonni-
gal-Katz (2007).
15 For a review, see Enaudeau and Bonnigal-Katz (2007).
13 The Freedom Riders of the American civil rights movement challenged racial segregation in public 
buses by riding them in the South in mixed racial groups. See Raymond Arsenault (2006).
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Disinterestedness, Arendt declared in her essay ‘Crisis in Culture’ from the early 
1960s, meant that ‘neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests 
of the self are involved’ (Arendt 1993a, p. 222). Even if such non-involvement were 
possible in the first place, however, what would then remain of the individual—and 
her capacity to judge—after the withdrawal from relevance of the ‘life interests’ and 
the ‘moral interests’ of herself? In any case, calling disinterestedness ‘impartiality’, 
by 1968, Arendt would define it as the ‘freedom from self-interest in thought and 
judgment’ (Arendt 1993b, p. 262), positioning it as ‘the root of so-called objectivity, 
this curious passion unknown outside Western civilization, for intellectual integrity 
at any price’ (Arendt 1993b, p. 263). It was only in Western civilisation, then, where 
one could know how to form, for the achievement of the common good, ‘objective’ 
opinions free from private interest and the moral interests of the self.
Equating opinion formation with political thought itself and asserting that its 
hallmark was its ‘representative’ character, Arendt averred: ‘The very process of 
opinion formation is determined by those in whose places somebody thinks and uses 
his own mind, and the only condition for this exertion of the imagination is dis-
interestedness, the liberation from one’s own private interests’ (Arendt 1993b, pp. 
241–242). But even in Western civilization, where such a Kantian ‘enlarged mental-
ity’ could take hold, Arendt knew:
Of course, I can refuse to do this and form an opinion that takes only my inter-
ests, or the interests of the group to which I belong, into account; nothing, 
indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the 
blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to 
judge. But the very quality of an opinion, as of a judgment, depends upon the 
degree of its impartiality. (Arendt 1993b, p. 242)
Thus, Arendt would position ‘impartiality’ as the criteria for judging the quality 
of an opinion in ‘the market place where opinion stands against opinion’ (Arendt 
1993b, p. 244). There in the market place, if the disinterested formation of impartial 
opinions commonly failed, then ‘blind obstinacy’, a stubborn refusal to be persuaded 
would have taken hold, making evident a ‘lack of imagination and failure to judge’, 
as if imagination and judgement as such would require the successful generalization 
of an impartial opinion.
Besides her civilizational criteria for achieving impartiality, On Violence—
penned in 1969 shortly before ‘Civil Disobedience’ and shortly after ‘Truth and 
Politics’—demonstrates Arendt’s racial, if not outright racist, disdain for ‘interest 
groups’ who, in the context of the rebellious 1960s, acted on particular self-serving 
interests instead of partaking in the disinterested creation of a common opinion. In a 
notorious passage of this text, Arendt wrote:
Serious violence entered the scene [of the student movement in 1960s] only 
with the appearance of the Black Power movement on the campuses. Negro 
students, the majority of them admitted without academic qualification, 
regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of 
the black community. Their interest was to lower academic standards. (Arendt 
1969, p. 18)
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Arendt protested further that rather than ‘the disinterested and usually highly moral 
claims of the white rebels’, the academic establishment tended to yield more to 
‘Negro demands, even if they [were] clearly silly and outrageous’ (Arendt 1969, 
p. 19). In a revealing appendix to her racialized juxtaposition of the disinterested 
claims of ‘the white rebels’ with the self-interested demands of ‘the Negro students’, 
Arendt would forcefully assert that ‘Bayard Rustin, the Negro civil-rights leader, 
has said all there is to be said on this matter’: ‘black students were “suffering from 
the shock of integration” and looking for “an easy way out of their problems”; what 
Negro students need[ed] [was] “remedial training” so that they “can do mathemat-
ics and write a correct sentence”, not “soul courses”’ about—in Arendt’s words—
‘African literature, and other non-existent subjects’ (Arendt 1969, Appendix VIII to 
p. 19, n. 32 on p. 96). It is not irrelevant to observe here that Bayard Rustin, who 
courageously talked ‘common sense’ according to Arendt (1969, Appendix VII to 
p. 19, n. 32 on p. 96) became a neo-conservative by the end of his life (see Creegan 
2016).
Arendt’s constitutive, racialized contrast between the disinterestedness of the 
white rebels and the self-interestedness of the Black Power movement was inti-
mately tied to her critique of violence.16 Whereas the former group stood for ‘nonvi-
olent “participatory democracy”’ and sought to build power, what the Black Power 
movement offered was, according to Arendt, ‘interests plus violence’ (Arendt 1969, 
p. 19). Further, the interests of the Black Power movement—conveniently excluded 
from the racially unmarked categories of ‘the students’ and ‘the student movement’ 
by Arendt—included ‘an ideological commitment to the non-existent “Unity of the 
Third World”’, which revealed, to her mind, ‘an obvious interest in a black-white 
dichotomy … an escape into a dream world in which Negroes would constitute an 
overwhelming majority of the world’s population’ (Arendt 1969, footnote 37, pp. 
21–22). The case was different with ‘the students’, she found, who, ‘caught between 
the two superpowers and equally disillusioned by East and West’, pursued a third 
ideology ‘inevitably’ (Arendt 1969, footnote 37, p. 21).
Arendt assessed the student movement along with the New Left as a global phe-
nomenon of rebellion and praised ‘its bold courage in practice’, identifying their 
slogan and claim for participatory democracy as ‘the common denominator of the 
rebellions in the East and West’, which derived, she asserted, from ‘the best in the 
revolutionary tradition’ (Arendt 1969, pp. 22–23). But once again, what was excep-
tionally striking to Arendt about this rebellion was what she designated as its ‘moral 
character’ (Arendt 1969, p. 23). ‘Nothing, indeed, about the movement is more 
striking than its disinterestedness’, she found (Arendt 1969, p. 23). And in a cru-
cial formulation, Arendt indicated what the moral character of this disinterestedness 
16 For an excellent overview of Arendt’s understanding of violence in relation to power, and how the two 
are ‘essentially antithetical in principle’, see Hutchings (2017). Also see the unsparing critique by Gines 
(2014) of Arendt’s ‘double-sided approach to violence’ whereby Arendt ‘presents violence uncritically in 
some contexts’, including in The Jewish Writings, and ‘hypercritically in other contexts’, especially when 
she considers anti-colonial struggles. Patricia Owens (2009, p. 1 and especially pp. 13–33) examines how 
‘we also find in Arendt’s work praise for the experience of war as the quintessential moment for humans 
to be most fully alive and political’.
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entailed: ‘To be sure, every revolutionary movement has been led by the disinter-
ested, who were motivated by compassion or by a passion for justice’ (Arendt 1969, 
p. 24). Disinterested compassion and passion for justice then, as opposed to particu-
lar interests, were what Arendt cited as evidence of the ‘moral character’ of collec-
tive political action.
Yet, to return to the disobedients of ‘Civil Disobedience’, Arendt would reserve 
the relevance of moral imperatives to the domain of individual conscience and acts, 
rejecting their mobilization as justification for collective acts of disobedience.17 She 
was certain that
arguments raised in defense of individual conscience or individual acts, that is, 
moral imperatives and appeals to a ‘higher law’, be it secular or transcendent, 
are inadequate when applied to disobedience; on this level, it will not only be 
‘difficult’ but impossible ‘to keep civil disobedience from being a philosophy 
of subjectivity … intensely and exclusively personal, so that any individual, 
for whatever reason, can disobey’. (Arendt 1970, pp. 56–57)
What was also difficult, if not impossible, then, was for Arendt to keep her own 
characterization of civil disobedience and ‘every revolutionary movement’ from 
becoming an intensely moral and personal ‘philosophy of subjectivity’ itself. Arendt 
attempted to overcome this difficulty by intimating that rather than ‘subjective illu-
sions’ (see Enaudeau and Bonnigal-Katz 2007) common opinion and collective 
agreement ‘objectively’ grounded civil disobedience and revolutionary movements. 
But she did not explain in which sense the ‘moral passion for justice’ animating the 
disinterested formation of common opinion could be considered impartial or objec-
tive, nor did she elucidate how such a passion would not appeal to a ‘higher law’, be 
it secular or transcendent.
In any case, for Arendt, what the Black Power movement collectively held was 
not common opinion, but common interest, as if the latter did not require articula-
tion, persuasion, consensus or agreement, and as if it could not, categorically, be 
driven by a disinterested passion for justice. Moreover, what the Black Power move-
ment as an ‘interest group’ shared were particular interests given by a common and 
unchangeable ‘race’, while Arendt understood race, at least in this case, as ‘a fact 
of life’ (Arendt 1969, p. 76), as in ‘the organic and natural facts—[of] a white or 
black skin—which no persuasion or power could change’ (Arendt 1969, p. 76).18 Is 
17 Conscience, for Arendt, was the product of an internal dialogue between me and myself and was con-
cerned primarily with the relationship of myself to myself. It was a private, subjective, and unpolitical 
matter. Accordingly, as Smith (2010, p. 151) finds, ‘conscientious objection is characterized by Arendt as 
an “unpolitical” protest, a potentially commendable, but ultimately subjective, and in a sense, self-inter-
ested action’. For an examination of Arendt’s struggle with the concept of ‘conscience’ in her Eichmann 
In Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, see Çubukçu (2015).
18 This understanding of ‘race’ as an organic and natural fact, which ‘no persuasion or power could 
change’ complements Arendt’s (1958) assertion in The Origin of Totalitarianism that ‘our political life 
rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and 
change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals. The dark back-
ground of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique nature, breaks into 
the political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference reminds us of the limitations of 
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it surprising then that she would also find that ‘it is always the same story: interest 
groups do not join the rebels’ (Arendt 1969, footnote 39 on p. 23)—white rebels, let 
it be underscored, whose ‘revolutionary idea’, according Arendt, was disinterested 
‘moral passion’ (Arendt 1969, footnote 39 on p. 23)? Nothing was of surprise here, 
at least not for Arendt, who also opined that it went ‘against the very nature of self-
interest to be enlightened’ (Arendt 1969, p. 78).
II
In ‘Civil Disobedience’, Arendt recognized that ‘disobedience to the law, civil and 
criminal, has become a mass phenomenon in recent years, not only in America, but 
also in a great many other parts of the world’ (Arendt 1970, p. 69). Yet, despite the 
global reach of the phenomenon, in a series of arduous moves, she offered such a 
justification for civil disobedience that it would have no validity outside the United 
States. This was the case because while certain public acts of non-violent lawbreak-
ing could be justified as civil disobedience according to Arendt, the exceptionality 
of the United States as a revolutionary republic and the particularity of the ‘spirit 
of its laws’ (Arendt 1970, p. 83) served as the ground on which such acts could be 
justified and justified as properly American ways of breaking the law. The ‘spirit’ of 
American laws, in brief, was what would guarantee the civil—hence the non-crimi-
nal, even the necessary—character of particular acts of lawbreaking and do so only 
in the United States, exceptionally.
According to Arendt, not only was civil disobedience ‘compatible with the spirit 
of American laws’ (Arendt 1970, p. 99), but it was also ‘primarily American in ori-
gin and substance’ (Arendt 1970, p. 83). This was the case considering that:
No other country, and other language, has even a word for it, and that the 
American republic is the only government having at least a chance to cope 
with it—not, perhaps, in accordance with its statutes, but in accordance with 
the spirit of its laws. The United States owes it origin to the American Revolu-
tion, and this revolution carried within it a new, never fully articulated concept 
of law, which was the result of no theory but had been formed by the extraordi-
nary experiences of the early colonists. (Arendt 1970, p. 83)
What then was this spirit? ‘Consent’, argued Arendt, ‘in the sense of active sup-
port and continuing participation in all matters of public interest’, was the ‘spirit’ 
of American law, its ‘new concept of law’ (Arendt 1970, p. 85). While such con-
sent was ‘indeed easy to denounce as mere fiction’ of an original social contract 
between a people and its government, in the case of ‘the American prerevolutionary 
experience, with its numerous covenants and agreements’, it was ‘no mere fiction’ 
in Arendt’s eyes (Arendt 1970, p. 85). In fact, Arendt argued that the signatories of 
human activity— which are identical with the limitations of human equality’ (Arendt 1973, p. 301), 




the American Declaration of Independence were thinking in terms of the ‘horizontal 
version of the social contract’ (1970, p. 86) articulated by Locke as the ‘generaliza-
tion and conceptualization’ of specifically American experiences (Arendt 1970, p. 
87).
Moreover, while ‘consent—meaning that voluntary membership must be assumed 
for every citizen in the community’ (Arendt 1970, p. 87) was, except in the case of 
naturalization, ‘at least as open to the reproach of being a fiction as the aboriginal 
contract’, Arendt mobilized the no less vexing concept of tacit consent to argue that 
such a reproach would be ‘existentially and theoretically’ invalid (Arendt 1970, p. 
87). ‘Tacit consent is not a fiction; it is inherent in the human condition’ (Arendt 
1970, pp. 87–88), she asserted. Every newborn came into a particular community 
and this ‘factual situation’ implied ‘a kind of conformity to the rules under which 
the great game of the world is played in the particular group’, whereby ‘tacit con-
sent [is] given in exchange for the community’s tacit welcome of the new arrivals’ 
(Arendt 1970, p. 88), she found. But even if this existential scenario were valid, a 
question would still remain: could such tacit consent ever be considered voluntary? 
In the case of the United States, at least, Arendt thought so: ‘We might call it volun-
tary, though, when the child happens to be born into a community in which dissent 
is also a legal and de-facto possibility once he has grown into a man’ (Arendt 1970, 
p. 88). And in the next sentence, she would attempt to tie, ‘somehow’, the possibil-
ity of dissent with the very existence of tacit consent: ‘Dissent implies consent, and 
is the hallmark of free government; one who knows that he may dissent knows also 
that he somehow consents when he does not dissent’ (Arendt 1970, p. 88).
Whether or not Arendt’s particular account of the United States as ‘a society of 
consent’—based on what Tocqueville called ‘tacit agreement, a sort of consensus 
universalis’19—is convincing, it could not completely ignore one crucial fact. In 
Arendt’s words, ‘the reason [Tocqueville] could predict the future of Negroes and 
Indians for more than a century ahead [lied] in the simple and frightening fact that 
these people had never been included in the original consensus universalis of the 
American republic’ (Arendt 1970, p. 90). In fact, not only were African Americans 
and Native Americans excluded from the original consensus universalis, arguably, 
their enslavement, slaughter, and dispossession through violent acts of settler colo-
nialism were constitutive of the revolutionary republic that Arendt so praised.20 But 
in ‘Civil Disobedience’, Arendt did not entertain such interpretations of the violent 
19 Arendt’s indebtedness to Tocqueville is not appreciated enough by many commentators on ‘Civil Dis-
obedience’. For example, see Smith (2010).
20 Compare Rana (2010), The Two Faces of American Freedom, for instance, with Arendt’s (1963) On 
Revolution, where she discusses the American Revolution at length. Also see Gines’s detailed account 
of the acknowledgement yet disavowal of racial slavery in Arendt’s On Revolution. As Gines observes, 
‘although slavery is understood to be a crime by Arendt, it is almost simultaneously dismissed as a social 
question. Accordingly, the founding fathers are celebrated for focusing on political rather than social 
issues, even while she notes that they understood that the institution of slavery from the beginning had 
undermined the political principle of freedom’ (2014, p. 59, emphasis added).
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and racist ‘spirit’ of American law,21 except when she critiqued the manifestation of 
such interpretations in the abolitionist movement and the black organizations of her 
time.
Thus, the ‘tragedy’ of the abolitionist movement was, according Arendt, that ‘it 
could appeal only to individual conscience, and neither to the law of the land nor 
to the opinion of the country’ (Arendt 1970, p. 90). It is telling that Arendt marked 
this predicament not as the constitutive ‘tragedy’ of the American republic—with 
its racist laws and public opinion that legalized and legitimized slavery—but as the 
grounds for criticizing the abolitionist movement’s
anti-institutional bias, its abstract morality, which condemned all institutions 
as evil because they tolerated the evil of slavery, and which certainly did not 
help in promoting those elementary measures of humane reform by which in 
all other countries the slaves were gradually emancipated into the free society. 
(Arendt 1970, p. 90)
Further still, Arendt preferred to think of slavery, which she called the ‘original 
crime’, as a ‘tacit exclusion from the tacit consensus’ of the American nation with-
out explaining what exactly was tacit about the bloody practice of slavery—or the 
mass slaughter and dispossession of Native Americans through settler colonialism—
which by definition negated consent, the alleged ‘spirit’ of American law (Arendt 
1970, pp. 90–91).
Instead, ‘consent as it is implied in the right to dissent—the spirit of American 
law and the quintessence of American Government’, Arendt insisted, ‘spells out and 
articulates the tacit consent given in exchange for the community’s tacit welcome 
of new arrivals, of the inner immigration through which it constantly renews itself’ 
(Arendt 1970, p. 88). Equating this ‘general tacit consent’ or consensus universalis 
with consent to the American constitution, moreover, Arendt was careful to argue 
that it did not imply consent to specific laws or specific policies, even when the lat-
ter were the result of majority decision (Arendt 1970, pp. 88–89). In any case, in 
the late 1960s, ‘the current danger of rebellion in the United States’ did not arise, 
to Arendt’s mind, from dissent and resistance to particular laws: ‘what we are con-
fronted with is a constitutional crisis of the first order’ (Arendt 1970, p. 89, empha-
sis added), she argued.
It was the coincidence of ‘two very different factors’, Arendt found, which 
effected this constitutional crisis:
There are the frequent challenges to the Constitution by the administration, 
with the consequential loss of confidence in constitutional processes by the 
people, that is, the withdrawal of consent; and there has come into the open, at 
21 This oversight (to say the least) is consistent with Arendt’s (1969) conceptual distinctions in On Vio-
lence, where ‘Arendt banishes violence from politics conceptually, but fails to engage with the problem 
of how violence might both be, on occasion, constitutive of politics, and not contaminate it’ (Frazer and 
Hutchings 2008, pp. 90–108, p. 102). See also Kautzer’s (2019, p. 2) convincing argument that in On 
Violence, Arendt implicitly relies on ‘a constitutive and racialized form of violence’, which leaves ‘legal 
and state violence presumed, but untheorized’.
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about the same time, the more radical unwillingness of certain sections of the 
population to recognize the consensus universalis. (Arendt 1970, p. 89)
What is remarkable in Arendt’s double-formulation of these two factors is how it 
assigns responsibility for the constitutional crisis that she perceived. On the one 
hand, it was the United States’ administration which Arendt found responsible for 
occasioning the withdrawal of consent by ‘the people’. On the other hand, how-
ever, Arendt placed responsibility for the constitutional crisis squarely on the radi-
cal unwillingness of ‘certain sections of the population’ to recognize the consensus 
universalis, including ‘the Negro people of America … these people who had never 
been welcome’ (Arendt 1970, p. 91).22 But if they had never been welcome (though 
such a formulation was deceptive—the enslaved were indeed welcomed by settlers 
for the exploitation of their labour power) along with Native Americans whose lands 
were appropriated through settler colonialism, Arendt failed to explain why these 
‘sections of the population’ could or should be expected to offer consent, tacit or 
otherwise, to the consensus universalis, or the American constitution, at all.
Instead of reflecting sufficiently on this question that would haunt her discussion 
of civil disobedience in the United States, concerning contemporary ‘black organi-
zations’ of her time, Arendt dismissively declared that ‘quite a number of their lead-
ers care little about the rules of nonviolence for civil disobedience and, often, just 
as little about the issues at stake—the Vietnam war, specific defects in our institu-
tions—because they are in open rebellion against all of them’ (Arendt 1970, p. 92). 
Lumping together an undifferentiated mass of organizations diverse in their political 
orientation and forms of action, Arendt thereby excluded from the domain of civil 
disobedience—whose ‘rules’ spelled non-violence to her mind—‘black organiza-
tions’ that allegedly cared not for such rules.23 Rather than granting the possibil-
ity that the open rebellion of black organizations against all institutions of a soci-
ety that excluded them from its consensus universalis could be considered justified 
and legitimate, Arendt denied such organizations engaged in lawbreaking action the 
very possibility of practicing civil disobedience. What is more, since disobedience 
to the law could be either civil or criminal according to Arendt, she contributed to 
the criminalization of these black organizations.24 In that, she was keeping with an 
American tradition in fact.
‘It is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and 
this support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into exist-
ence to begin with’, Arendt wrote (1969, p. 41), in the midst of the constitutional 
22 On the same page, Arendt asserts that ‘we need not be surprised that the present belated attempts to 
welcome the Negro population explicitly into the otherwise tacit consensus universalis of the nation are 
not trusted’. Interpreting this remark to be ‘insightful’, Gines nevertheless observes how the ‘insight is 
again undermined by her myopic and monolithic representation of Black people as violent and having 
misplaced priorities’ in the sentences that follow (2014, p. 121).
23 Rather than an accurate historical description, such statements by Arendt reflect her ‘dismissive 
assumptions about where Black leaders’ “cares” do and do not lie’ (Gines 2014, p. 122).
24 As Angela Davis and many critical race theorists have argued, crime is ‘one of the masquerades 
behind which “race”, with all its menacing ideological complexity, mobilizes old public fears and creates 
new ones’ (1997, pp. 256–279, p. 266).
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crisis, nay, the revolutionary situation fraught with ‘the danger of rebellion’ (Arendt 
1970, p. 89) that she perceived. She thus opposed a tradition of thought—includ-
ing Marx and Benjamin—that saw in violence, not consent, the original force that 
brings laws into existence.25 At once, she wove together concepts—support, con-
sent, opinion, power—to contest the traditional centrality accorded to violence in 
understanding that which compels ‘obedience’ to the law. Employing an analogy 
between obeying the law and playing ‘a game with valid rules’, Arendt wrote:
For the point of these rules is not that I submit to them voluntarily or recognize 
theoretically their validity, but that in practice I cannot enter the game unless 
I conform; my motive for acceptance is my wish to play, and since men exist 
only in the plural, my wish to play is identical with my wish to live. Every 
man is born into a community with pre-existing rules which he ‘obeys’ first of 
all because there is no other way for him to enter the great game of the world. 
(Arendt 1969, Appendix XI to p. 41, n. 62, on p. 97)
By analogy, Arendt suggested, one obeys the law because one wishes to live in the 
plural, where power arises from the common opinion of and consent granted by 
a given number of people and where the strength of opinion, like that of consent, 
depends ‘on the number of those with whom it is associated’ (Arendt 1970, p. 68).26
Arendt further claimed that if ‘I may wish to change the rules of the game, as the 
revolutionary does, or to make an exception for myself, as the criminal does’, such 
wishes would entail—even when they involved lawbreaking action—not the denial 
of the law on principle, but disobedience to it (Arendt 1969, Appendix XI to p. 41, 
n. 62, on p. 97). To her mind, to deny the rules of the game, or the law, on principle 
meant ‘no mere “disobedience”, but the refusal to enter human community’ (Arendt 
1969, Appendix XI to p. 41, n. 62, on p. 97) as such. She did not go so far as to sug-
gest that ‘certain sections of the population’ in the United States who demonstrated 
a radical unwillingness to recognize the consensus universalis thereby refused to 
enter the human community. Arendt did argue, however, that the constitutional crisis 
in the United States was due to the radical refusal of ‘certain sections of the popula-
tion’ to recognize the American constitution—a law whose ‘spirit’ was not consent, 
pace Arendt, but violence and racism in their eyes.
Opinion formation involved discursive, representative thinking: validity in mat-
ters of opinion ‘depends on free agreement and consent; they are arrived at by dis-
cursive, representative thinking; and they are communicated by means of persuasion 
and dissuasion’, Arendt indeed argued (1993b, p. 247). Nevertheless, she did not 
identify her criteria for designating as verbal violence certain opinions expressed 
by black students (Arendt 1969, p. 19), which appeared not as opinions to her mind, 
but as self-interested ‘Negro demands’ that were ‘clearly silly and outrageous’ 
(Arendt 1969, p. 19). Black violence and ‘Negro demands’ went hand in hand for 
25 For a brilliant exposition of the law-making capacity of violence, see Walter Benjamin (1921), ‘Cri-
tique of Violence’.
26 While power could employ violence, according to Arendt, it could not arise from violence—power 
depends on numbers, and violence on implements.
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Hannah Arendt, who insisted that neither was legitimate. In her attempt to evaluate 
‘the citizen’s moral relation to the law in a society of consent’ (Arendt 1970, p. 51), 
Arendt took it for granted that the United States was one, while she excluded from 
the domain of civil disobedience black organizations that wished to change the rules 
of the consent-giving-game through lawbreaking action, which she condemned as 
‘black violence’ (Arendt 1969, p. 19).
III
Towards a conclusion, I would like to reflect on the observation by an Arendtian 
scholar that Arendt was ‘strongly opposed to organizing political and legal institu-
tions, much less understanding the history of her time, in terms of race’, and that for 
her, ‘it was disastrous to have a polity in which some citizens had more rights, more 
privileges and immunities, than others did, whatever their race and ethnicity’ (King 
2010, p. 133). To my mind, such a philosophical and political taste for what Angela 
Davis critiques as ‘race-blindness’ (Davis 1997) constitutes an essential reason why 
in the 1960s, Arendt was ‘scathing about what she felt were racist political, educa-
tional, and cultural demands of Black Power advocates’ (King 2010, p. 133, empha-
sis added).27
Arendt’s scathing denunciation of the alleged racism of the Black Power move-
ment, coupled with her ‘diatribe against affirmative action’ (see Jay 1997, p. 350) 
could suffice to place her thought within conservative (at best) or racist (at worst) 
understandings of what racism and antiracism entailed in the context of the United 
States. In December 1968, Arendt wrote:
Today the situation is quite clear. Negroes demand their own curriculum with-
out the exacting standards of white society and, at the same time, they demand 
admission in accordance with their percentage in the population at large, 
regardless of standards. In other words they actually want to take over and 
adjust standards to their own level. This is a much greater threat to our institu-
tions of higher learning than the student riots.28
The least that could be said about Arendt’s judgements concerning such ‘Negro 
demands’ is that ‘they do little to suggest that Arendt’s mentality was very enlarged 
when it came to the issue of race in America’ (see Jay 1997, footnote 12). But how 
large could her ‘enlarged mentality’ be—even had she pushed it to its limits—given 
that the decided absence of other standpoints was a constitutive element of this 
mentality?
Explaining the framework of enlarged mentality for the New Yorker in 1967, 
Arendt wrote: ‘I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different 
27 In fact, Arendt (1969, p. 77) finds that it is ‘Black racism’ which has the potential to provoke ‘a really 
violent white backlash’.
28 Emphasis added. See Hannah Arendt’s letter to Mary McCarthy, 21 December 1968, quoted in Martin 
Jay (1997, p. 350, footnote 12). For the rest of this paragraph see Brightman (1995, pp. 230–231).
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viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; 
that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the 
actual views of those who stand somewhere else. … I can make myself the repre-
sentative of everybody else’, she asserted (Arendt 1993b, pp. 241–242, emphasis 
added). But could she? Could anybody?29 If the answer is no, then it is difficult 
not to disagree with Arendt’s entire Kantian framework of representative thinking 
and judgement—including its impossible demands for impartiality and disinterest-
edness—which were ‘flawed’ and inhibited her understanding of ‘the Negro prob-
lem’ (Gines 2014, p. 2). In Arendt’s case, this enlarged mentality led to a judgement 
about what is best for the common good in accordance with the particular standards 
of what she did not hesitate to call ‘white society’,30 unless of course, she thought 
these standards were universally valid—valid not only for assessing achievement in 
the United States but across the world, not only for ‘the humanities’ but also for 
‘humanity’.31
Arendt’s strong rejection of affirmative action and the Black Power movement 
can be interpreted as an early articulation of contemporary—and categorical—
objections to ‘identity politics’ on the grounds that it constitutes ‘reverse racism’, 
or else, a divisive form of politics. In this reading, Arendt would be prescient in 
having anticipated what Angela Davis diagnosed as the ‘post-Civil Rights era’ some 
30 years after 1968, an era in which ‘race itself becomes an increasingly proscribed 
subject’:
In the dominant political discourse [race] is no longer acknowledged as a per-
vasive structural phenomenon, requiring the continuation of such strategies as 
affirmative action, but rather is represented primarily as a complex of preju-
dicial attitudes, which carry equal weight across all racial boundaries. Black 
leadership is thus often discredited and the identification of race as a public, 
political issue itself called into question through the invocation of, and applica-
tion of the epithet ‘black racist’ … (Davis 1997, p. 264)
Perhaps Arendt did not so much anticipate as she did participate in the very arrival 
of such a post-civil rights era in the United States—after all, she was already writing 
publicly about ‘Black racism’ in 1969 (Arendt 1969, p. 77). But are we still in this 
29 It is important to recall here that impartiality achieved through representative thinking is, for Arendt, 
‘the root of so-called objectivity, this curious passion unknown outside Western civilization, for intellec-
tual integrity at any price’.
30 See Hannah Arendt’s letter to Mary McCarthy, 21 December 1968, quoted in Martin Jay (1997, p. 
350, footnote 12).
31 Arendt (1993c, p. 192) had a ‘conservative’ understanding of education and its relationship to ‘cul-
ture’, which is beyond the scope of this article to examine. Allow me to note here her view that ‘con-
servatism, in the sense of conservation, is of the essence of educational activity, whose task is always to 
cherish and protect something’. As for ‘culture’, I should note the powerful argument by political theorist 
Jimmy Casas Klausen that Arendt’s understanding of ‘culture’, developed in her Origins of Totalitarian-
ism and later work, is grounded on ‘antiprimitivist’ premises that order humanity hierarchically. How-
ever, Klausen does not seriously consider how ideas of ‘culture’ can operate as proxies for ‘race’ and 
as alibis for racism. See Klausen (2010, pp. 394–423). Also see the response and defence of Arendt by 
Gundogdu (2011, pp. 661–667) and Klausen’s (2011, pp. 668–673) response to Gundogdu.
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era, or not yet? In either case, is it not conceivable that Arendt would have seen in 
‘All Lives Matter’ an antiracist opinion today, which assumes force—lawbreaking 
or not—against ‘Black Lives Matter’?
I have made the argument that Arendt’s thoughts about the ostensibly non-racial 
subjects of civil disobedience and lawbreaking were underwritten by racial, when 
not racist, modes of thinking. This should hardly be surprising, unless one would 
expect an exception in Arendt’s case, an exception from the white supremacism 
that engulfed political life in the United States long before and long after 1968. And 
why should Arendt have been immune from the racism of her time—both implicit 
and explicit—which permeated political thought across ‘Western civilization’, 
and whose supremacy she proudly expounded?32 The answer lies in the vitality of 
antiracist thought and action in her own day, which she took pains to exclude from 
the zone of civil disobedience by naming them unpolitical manifestations of con-
science, self-interest, and violence. Here, Martin Luther King shall speak, to whose 
name and ‘conscience’ Arendt only once refers in her reflections on civil disobe-
dience.  ‘Our nation was born in genocide when it embraced the doctrine that the 
original American, the Indian, was an inferior race. Even before there were large 
numbers of Negroes on our shores, the scar of racial hatred had already disfigured 
colonial society. From the sixteenth century forward, blood flowed in battles of 
racial supremacy. We are perhaps the only nation which tried as a matter of national 
policy to wipe out its indigenous population. Moreover, we elevated that tragic 
experience into a noble crusade. Indeed, even today we have not permitted ourselves 
to reject or to feel remorse for this shameful episode. Our literature, our films, our 
drama, our folklore all exalt it’ (King 1963).33 Today, as we think through our own 
emergencies across the world, our own obedience and disobedience to the law, now 
is as good a time as any to think through whom and what we hasten or hesitate to 
call ‘racist’ and ‘violent’—and why.
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